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In the present paper I aim to discuss the philosophical foundations of the early cor-
respondence principle (1917–1924), by comparing the conceptual structure underly-
ing the rst correspondence principle with the procedure of analogy that Immanuel
Kant introduced in the Critique of Judgment from 1790. On such a comparison, I
will seek to demonstrate the consistency of the conceptual ratio according to which
the correspondence principle is to the classical “concepts” of space and time, as these
a priori forms of intuition (space and time), in Kant, are related to the separate fac-
ulty of pure intuition. As a result, it will turn out that the conceptual structure of
the correspondence principle suits to the Kantian doctrine of a separate faculty of
pure intuition, which is divided from the faculty of understanding. e aim is to
shed new light on the line of reasoning underlying Niels Bohr’s analogical thinking
in quantum physics.
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1. Introduction
e development of quantum physics took place in three stages. e rst,
roughly 1900–1913 saw the development of what is known as the “rst quan-
tum theory,” which explained the full spectrum of thermal radiation. e
second (1913–1925), known as the “old quantum theory” was a sort of hybrid
theory, in that it retained much of the structure of classical mechanics and
added postulates inspired by experimental results on light emitted and ab-
sorbed by atoms, postulates that did not cohere well with classical mechan-
ics. e years 1925–1932 saw the formulation of what we now call quantum
mechanics, which forms the basis of contemporary physics.
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Niels Bohr (1885–1962) was one of the architects of the old quantum the-
ory, and he gave tremendous contributions to the elaboration of the new
quantum mechanics as well. Moreover, his name is linked to the formula-
tion of one of the most known and less understood principle of quantum
theory: the correspondence principle.
Bohr formulated the correspondence principle in the context of the old
quantum theory, but for some commentators and historians of physics its
conceptual importance can be extended to quantum mechanics. What is
undisputed is the fact that Niels Bohr’s correspondence relation is today still
a rather controversial scientic principle. Scientists, philosophers of science,
and historians of science have indeed confronted each other on its philo-
sophical foundations without ever reaching a real real agreement, perhaps
the main reason being that the correspondence principle seems to assume
dierent meanings with the passing of time.
At least up to the advent of the new quantum mechanics, in 1925, the
correspondence principle was a formal analogy between atomic processes
and classical harmonic components of motion, that is, an analogy was es-
tablished between a certain high quantum number limit of the quantum-
theoretical frequencies and the classical frequencies. To say it with Bohr’s
words, under certain conditions (for high quantum numbers, or with h, the
Planck’s constant, very small): “e possibility of an emission of a radia-
tion of such a frequency [between two stationary states: i.e. any of several
energy states an atom may occupy without emitting electromagnetic radia-
tion]may also be interpreted from analogywith the ordinary electrodynam-
ics” (Bohr 1913, 14), as an electron rotating round a nucleus in an elliptical
orbit will emit a radiation whose frequency is the frequency of revolution
of the electron. erefore, if one had to drop any space-time pictures of
events (as it happened aer 1924 as a consequence of the crisis of the helium
atom model), even the correspondence principle as a formal analogy had
to be relinquished. And what remained was the general idea of the formal
correspondence between classical harmonic components of motion (that is,
broadly speaking, the frequency of the electron in the elliptical orbit) and
quantum jumps (Darrigol 1997). It was at this stage of the development
of quantum theory that atomic processes lost their corresponding orbital
models, but the correspondence relation could still survive assuming a new
meaning: it held in a purely symbolicmanner, because transition amplitudes
had replaced classical components of motion (Bohr 1925, 852). As a result,
the established analogy between transition amplitudes and the mechanics
of orbits was so close that the set of transitions amplitudes became the true
atomic motion.
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In the present paper, I want to discuss the philosophical foundations of
the early correspondence principle (1917–1924), by comparing the concep-
tual structure underlying the rst correspondence principle with the proce-
dure of analogy used by Immanuel Kant.
e aim is to shed new light on the line of reasoning underlying Bohr’s
analogical thinking in quantum physics.
2. Bohr’s rst atomic theory
In this section, I will oer a glimpse of the formulation of the rst atomic
theory that Niels Bohr started to elaborate in 1912–1913. To begin with, it is
worth remembering that, at the time, Bohr’s aim was to explain the prop-
erties of chemical elements through the application of the quantum postu-
lates (stationary states and frequency rule) to Rutherford’s planetary model
of atoms. In 1911, Ernest Rutherford proposed a planetary model of the
atomwith a concentrated, massive nucleus, which only could give account of
the large-angle scattering observed in the experiments performed by Hans
Geiger and Ernest Marsden at Manchester’s laboratories.
Atomic models of the time were mainly based on ordinary electrody-
namics, for this reason they sooner or later would have led to irreconcilable
contradictions. But things started to change in the early 1910s, when most
part of quantum physicists became aware of the inadequacy of the classical
theories at the atomic scale. Aer the pioneering works of Planck (1900),
who introduced the constant h, and Einstein (1905, 1906), who extended
Planck’s hypothesis by propounding the idea that even light wasmade of dis-
crete quanta (and with his success in explaining the low-temperature degree
in the specic heats of solids), others followed: Hendrik Lorentz advocated
the hypothesis of an intimate connection between atomic structures and the
quantum of action. Arthur Haas also carried on this program. However,
the ideas were missing about how to explain the discrete emission spectra of
atoms from their constitution with the help of quantum theory. Niels Bohr
provided such ideas in the rst of three fundamental papers published in
1913: “On the Constitution of Atoms and Molecules.”
As is well known, Rutherford’s model too was mechanically and electro-
dynamically unstable. To remedy the stability problem, Bohr introduced the
concept of “stationary states” (in which the energy of the system is constant,
as the electron orbits around the atomic nucleuswithout emitting radiation),
which were subjected to the following assumptions:
(i) An atom can exist only in a discontinuous series of stationary states;
(ii) themotion of electrons in a stationary state can be discussed bymeans of
the ordinary mechanics (Bohr 1913, 7); (iii) the passing of electrons between
stationary states cannot be described by means of ordinary mechanics and
Roberto Angeloni 11
electrodynamics (Bohr 1913, 7); (iv) the frequency of the radiation emitted
or absorbed during a transition between two stationary states is given by
the dierence in energy between these states divided by Planck’s constant
i.e. the frequency rule, hν = E1 − E2, where h is Planck’s constant, ν is the
frequency of the emitted radiation, E1 and E2 are respectively the energy of
two stationary states.
As we can see, the assumption (i) can be also derived fromEinstein’s idea
of quantization; moreover, Johannes Stark had already used the concept of
stationary states in 1911.
By contrast, the assumption (iv) is a revolutionary step and implies the
daring idea for which Bohr’s atomic theory is known: the frequency of the
motion of the electron diers from the frequency of the emitted radiation.
In 1906, Einstein had already prospected this idea (the discrete selection of
mechanical states) although he was not brave enough to carry it through.
Since the assumptions (ii) and (iii) were not sucient to determine the
energy of stationary states, Bohr had to introduce a “quantum rule”: the en-
ergy of the nth stationary state is nh/2 times the orbital frequency of the
electron in this state. Assuming that the orbit of the electron is circular, this
assumption is equivalent with the assumption that the angular momentum
of the electron round the nucleus is equal to an entire multiple of h/2pi.
In particular, by setting the frequency of the emitted radiation equal to
half the nal orbital frequency, Bohr renounced the classical relation be-
tweenmotion and emitted radiation, although he still required an analogous
relation to subsist at the quantum level. is requirement is the conceptual
embryo of what Bohr would later call the correspondence principle.
Between 1913 and 1916, a series of corroborated predictions followed,
which, alongwithEinstein’s and Sommerfeld’s theoretical eorts, contributed
to the consolidation of the two fundamental assumptions of stationary states
and frequency rule, whose status of postulates would shi away in the course
of time.
Bohr’s atomic theory was able to account for some characteristic features
of (i) the so-called Stark’s eect, i.e. the eect of the electric eld on spectral
lines, (ii) the Zeeman’s eect, i.e. the eect of the magnetic eld on spectral
lines, and (iii) the double spectral lines.
Above all, the theory explained the inelastic collision of an electron with
amercury atomobservedduring the experiments conducted by James Franck
and Gustav Hertz in 1913. e Franck-Hertz experiments were an indirect
conrmation of both the frequency rules and the existence of stationary
states.
Franck andHertz assume that 4.9 volts corresponds to the energy nec-
essary to remove an electron from the mercury atom, but it seems
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that their experiments may possibly be consistent with the assump-
tion that this voltage corresponds only to the transition from the nor-
mal state to some other stationary state on the neutral atom. (Bohr
1915, 410–411)
In spite of the empirical evidence, Bohr doubted the generality of the
frequency rule at least until 1915, to the extent that he hypothesized that a
correction to this rulewas needed for explaining the splitting of spectral lines
in magnetic and electric elds. In this conceptual framework, Bohr went to
mature the idea of the stability of stationary states as the only fundamental
assumption, i.e. endowedwith the necessary generality, of his atomic theory.
To reinforce this idea, Bohr introduced this fundamental assumption:
T¯
ω
= 1
2
hn (2.1)
with T¯ the average of the kinetic energy, and ω the frequency of the
electron in its periodic orbit. is relation is a generalization of Planck’s
quantum hypothesis for the harmonic oscillator of one dimension (Rosen-
feld and Hoyer 1981, 341); that is, the principle E = nhω.e relation T¯ω was
suggested by Ehrenfest’s theory of adiabatic invariance, according to which
T¯
ω was the fundamental quantity subject to a quantum condition.
e so-called principle of mechanical transformability of stationary
states, better known as Ehrenfest’s adiabatic theory, was regarded by Bohr
as a fundamental assumption to be used “to x” the stationary states of an
atomic system among the continuous multitude of mechanically possible
motions (Bohr 1918, 9).
As a matter of fact, the quantum conditions must be adiabatic invari-
ant: the probability of the stationary states must remain unaltered during
continuous transformations, which must be innitely slow.
To summarize, Bohr needed a relation to dene the variation of the sta-
tionary states in a system under external conditions. According to the rela-
tion (2.1), these variations cannot be calculated on the basis of the classical
theories ofmechanics and electrodynamics. But, if the variation of the exter-
nal conditions is very slow (adiabatic), we may expect that the motion of the
system in the stationary states can be dened by the application of ordinary
mechanics and electrodynamics.
All other assumptions, including the already mentioned frequency rule,
could hold only in the case of periodic systems. For this reason, Bohr, for
the time being (until 1915), limited the application of ordinary mechanics
to the motion in the stationary states of periodic systems like the harmonic
oscillator and the hydrogen atom, without extending it to multi-periodic
systems.
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In 1916, Einstein published the article “Emission and absorption of radi-
ation in quantum theory,” in which he showed that both Planck’s blackbody
law and Bohr’s theory of spectra could be derived by assuming conditions
for the statistical equilibrium on the relation between quantum transitions
and the density of the associated emitted radiation.
Einstein’s achievementwas a fundamental contribution to the consolida-
tion of a more general frequency rule and the existence of stationary states.
A second eort in this direction came from Sommerfeld’s 1916-work.
Sommerfeld and his collaborators applied some relativistic corrections to
the electrons orbiting around the nucleus, which, according to Bohr’s the-
ory of hydrogen atom, followed Kepler’s laws; that is: the electrons orbit the
nucleus as a planet orbits the sun, in an ellipse with the sun at one focus,
while the electron is inuenced by an attraction inversely proportional to
the square of the distance in accord with Newton’s law. In the case of elec-
trons, however, the attraction at a given distance is not determined by mass,
but by the electric charges of the electrons themselves. But at unchanged
charges and mass variation, the electronic motion would be also modied.
According to Einstein’s theory of special relativity, the mass of the electrons
depends on the velocity, which varies in an elliptical orbit.
It turned out that the electronic motion assumed a value of more gen-
eral nature with respect to the Kepler-like ellipses considered in the Bohr’s
theory.
Einstein’s and Sommerfeld’s equations stood for “particular laws” that
served the purpose to pinpoint the two postulates (stationary states and fre-
quency rule), along with the empirical evidence oered by the Franck-Hertz
experiments, on the way to the quantization of atomic systems. As Bohr
pointed out, Einstein derived Planck’s law by introducing further assump-
tions regarding the probability of transition of a system between two sta-
tionary states, by means of Boltzmann’s principle on the relation between
entropy and probability, andWien’s displacement-law (cf. Bohr 1918, 7). Ein-
stein’s attempt can therefore be regarded as a direct support to the generality
of the frequency rule.
As is known, until 1915 Bohr had found a quantum rule only for pe-
riodic systems, since he had expected the frequency rule to breakdown for
non-periodic systems. Sommerfeldwas searching for a quantizationmethod
for multi-periodic systems, which included the relativistic correction for the
Kepler problem, the Stark eect, and the Zeeman eect in relation to the
model of the hydrogen atom. Yet the relation he found out would have soon
shown a purely formal and arbitrary character (Kramers 1923, 148). Beyond a
shadow of a doubt, Sommerfeld started from considerations similar to those
Bohr had originally applied to the denition of the stationary states in the
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hydrogen atom. With his collaborators, Sommerfeld arrived at some for-
mal quantum rules, which allowed xing the stationary states in the hydro-
gen atom corresponding to the so-called double sets of quantum numbers.
However, such method was still of purely formal nature, as Sommerfeld put
forward a blind generalization of the quantum rules and of the frequency
rules, as such his theory predicted more spectral lines than those expected
by experimental results.
Sommerfeld’s method, known as the principle of selection, did not suc-
ceed in providing empirical evidence in the case of the Stark and Zeeman
eects in hydrogen atoms, but it held only if hydrogen atoms were undis-
turbed.
I point out that Bohr’s main objective was to describe the interactions
between radiation and matter. In order to pursue this aim, Bohr could not
limit his theory to the undisturbed hydrogen atom, but he had to extend it
to more complex systems.is fact implied the application of Bohr’s atomic
theory to multi-periodic systems. is was the roadmap to the formulation
of the correspondence principle.
3. e conceptual structure of the correspondence principle
Bohr arrived at the correspondence principle by means of the following ra-
tional tools: Ehrenfest’s adiabatic principle, Sommerfeld’s selection rule,
and Schwarzschild’s and Epstein’s analytical mechanics. It was the Epstein-
Schwarzschild theory, in particular, which allowed extending the conditions
of state tomulti-periodicmotions, i.e. to a set of systemsmore complex than
those considered at rst. It is worth pointing out that these tools allowed
Bohr to protect and carry on his mechanical model of the atom, and, at the
time, there was no other way (in this sense we can speak of “rational tools”)
“of describing in details the process of direct transition between two sta-
tionary states accompanied by an emission or absorption of radiation, and
we cannot be sure beforehand that such a description will be possible at all
by means of laws consistent with the application of the principle of conser-
vation of energy” (Bohr 1923b).
e correspondence principle provided Bohr’s theory with a wider gen-
erality with respect to previous attempts of quantization of atomic systems
(Darrigol 1992, 125). Specically, the correspondence principle allowed ex-
plaining the behavior of perturbed systems, which did not have to be multi-
periodic. By the formulation of the correspondence principle, Bohr’s theory
permitted the derivation of selection rules, intensities, and polarizations of
the perturbed systems, not only the spectra. e correspondence principle
did not require the perturbed systems to be multi-periodic, provided that
it applied to both periodic and multi-periodic systems. As a result, Bohr’s
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method became a subtle selection rule of multi-periodic motions from a
more fundamental non-multi-periodic system.
In 1917 Bohr formulated the concept of the “correspondence relation” in
a dra of the paper “On the Quantumeory of Line Spectra,” which was
published in 1918. ere, Bohr was able to derive Sommerfeld’s “selections
rule” for the Stark and Zeeman eects and in the ne structure of the hydro-
gen atom. From his previous results in the case of strictly periodic motions,
Bohr knew that each allowed quantum transition between stationary states
corresponded to one harmonic component of the classical motion. By ap-
plying this relation to the Zeeman eect, he was able to derive Sommerfeld’s
selection rule.
Bohr argued that the correspondence principle was not another rule to
add to the set of laws of the quantum theory, rather, in his view, it repre-
sented a fundamental law of much greater generality with respect to previ-
ous attempts of quantization of the theory.
Bohr wanted to re-establish continuity between the radiation associated
to the transition between stationary states and the observed radiation ac-
cording to classical electrodynamics. For this reason, we could think of this
principle as an extension of previous attempts of quantization of the atom.
More specically, the correspondence principle required that some of
the relations satised by the classical harmonics of motion should be pre-
served (exactly or approximately) for the “corresponding” quantum-theoreti-
cal intensities (Darrigol 2014, 247). is is the inner meaning of the corre-
spondence principle, which preserves the relation of the classical harmonics
of motion for the corresponding quantum-theoretical intensities.
To sum up, until 1922 the correspondence principle played a guiding
role in an open theory, as it showed a heuristic validity (Jammer 1966) in
systems without the limitation of multi-periodicity. In particular, the corre-
spondence principle permitted the rst extension of the quantum theory to
so-called perturbed systems, which did not have to be multi-periodic. Fur-
thermore, when in 1920 Kramers published the results regarding the rst
application of the correspondence principle, these showed that this method
succeeded in determining the eects of a small electric eld on the ne struc-
ture of a hydrogen atom, contrary to Sommerfeld’s selection rule, which in
this case showed its impotence.
Yet, aer two years, the American physicist John Van Vleck carried out
a new calculation of the ionization potentials for the Bohr-Kemble model of
the helium atom, whose results led Bohr to realize that the correspondence
principle could not be used to calculate the energy of the stationary states in
atoms with more than one electron.
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It isworth remembering that through the introduction of the principle of
mechanical transformability, Bohrwanted to show that the energy denition
of stationary states depended on the possibility of continuously deforming
the system in a way that would connect the stationary states (Darrigol 1992,
176). is property, which was introduced in order to dene the energy for
multi-periodic systems, and it was one of the fundamental assumptions of
the correspondence principle, did not hold in the case of the helium atom.
In fact, as Kramers showed, the motion in the normal state of the helium
model was mechanically unstable. e failure of the Bohr-Kemble model
was a breakthrough in the old quantum theory; as a consequence Bohr was
brought to reject any space-time description of radiation process.
However, I want to point out that the problem of the instability of the he-
lium atom was not Bohr’s chief preoccupation at the time. As is well known,
since mid-1922, both Bohr and Kramers had already become aware of the
mechanical instability of the normal state of the helium atom. Notwith-
standing the undisputable heuristic power of the correspondence principle—
which in 1922 guided Coster and Hevesy to the discovery of the missing ele-
ment 72 (hafnium)—Bohr did not overestimate the coherence of the theoret-
ical structure of his atomic theory, which was based on the correspondence
relation. Coherently, Bohr expressed a cautious optimism even in his Nobel
lecture of 11 December 1922:
By a theoretical explanation of natural phenomena we understand in
general a classication of the observations of a certain domain with
the help of analogies pertaining to other domains of observation,
where one presumably has to do with simpler phenomena.e most
that one candemandof a theory is that this classication can be pushed
so far that one can contribute to the development of the eld of ob-
servation by the prediction of new phenomena. When we consider
the atomic theory, we are, however, in the peculiar position that there
can be no question of an explanation in this last sense, since here we
have to do with phenomena which from the very nature of the case
are simpler than in any other eld of observation, where the phenom-
ena are always conditioned by the combined action of a large number
of atoms. We are therefore obliged to be modest in our demands and
content ourselves with concepts which are formal in the sense that
they do not provide a visual picture [Anskuelighed] of the sort one
is accustomed to in the explanations with which natural philosophy
deals. (Bohr 1923c, 44, italics added)
at is to say that Bohr warned against false optimism, as far as he was
aware of the formal character of the correspondence principle and the pro-
visionality of atomic orbits, to the extent that he was ready to modify their
conguration on the basis of new empirical ndings.
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Returning to the failure of the helium model, it is worth noting that the
rejection of the so-called “second atomic theory” did not concern Bohr’s pre-
vious use of space-time pictures of electronic motion.
e quantum theory presents [. . . ] a sharp departure from the ideas of
classical electrodynamics in the introduction of discontinuities into
the laws of nature. From the present point of view of physics, how-
ever, every description of natural processesmust be based on ideaswhich
have been introduced and dened in the classical theory. e question
therefore arises, whether it is possible to present the principles of the
quantum theory in such away that their application appears free from
contradiction. (Bohr 1923a, 1, italics added)
e space-time representation was the necessary basis for the applica-
tion of the correspondence principle, and its conceptual structure was hence
closely related to the use of classical concepts, specically the classical con-
cepts of space, time, and causality. Classical concepts would later become,
for Bohr, the necessary conditions for an unambiguous communication and
descriptions of quantum events.
Bohr aimed to dene the relation between emitted radiation and elec-
tronic motion by using a “formal analogy” with the classical relation in the
limit of high quantum numbers, although no causal and spatio-temporal
representation of the quantum processes, connecting emitted radiation and
electronic motion, could be given at the quantum level.
In spite of the a-causal nexus between emitted radiation and electronic
motion, the empirical data related to quantum phenomena, according to
Bohr, had to be subsumed under the category of causality. Bohr never de-
parted from this conceptual stance.
It should not be forgotten that the concept of causality underlies the
very interpretation of each result of experiment, and that even in the
co-ordination of experience one can never, in the nature of things,
have to do with well-dened breaks in the causal chain. (Bohr 1937,
293)
Since the classical principle of causality should underlie the “very inter-
pretation of each result of experiment,” one would expect that a causal rela-
tion had to be established also between the frequency of the orbiting electron
and the frequency of the emitted radiation.
In particular, the introduction by Bohr of the two assumptions deter-
mined the impossibility to provide a causal and spatio-temporal descrip-
tion of atomic processes, that is, the impossibility to dene the nature of
the emitted radiation. Bohr hence sought to establish a connection between
the motion in the stationary states of an atomic system and the possibil-
ity of a transition between two of these states, which he found out in the
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correspondence principle. Nevertheless, the “correspondence relation” was
a merely formal device: it succeeded, in fact, in describing the processes
taking place during the formation and re-organization of the atom, without
providing, though, the causal and spatio-temporal descriptions of quantum
processes. Bohr recognized the “formal character” of the correspondence
principle: since this principle could not explain the emitted radiation as an
eect of the orbital frequency, it had to rely on the “formal analogy” be-
tween the structures of the quantum theory and classical electrodynamics
to account for the nature of that radiation.
In a dra of the introduction to the 1918 paper “On the Quantume-
ory of Line-Spectra,” Bohr regarded the theory of line spectra, based on the
relation hν = E1 − E2, as a “formal” tool, as such only in a formal way the
quantum theory could be seen as a “natural generalization” of the classical
theory of radiation. Furthermore, in 1920, Bohr used for the rst time the
expression “correspondence principle” in the paper “On the Series Spectra of
the Elements,” in which he conveyed the idea of a “formal analogy” between
classical electrodynamics and the quantum theory of radiation.
Although the process of radiation cannot be described on the basis of
the ordinary theory of electrodynamics, according to which the na-
ture of the radiation emitted by an atom is directly related to the har-
monic components occurring in the motion of the system, there is
found, nevertheless, to exist a far-reaching correspondence between
the various types of possible transitions between the stationary states
on the one hand and the various harmonic components of themotion
on the other hand. is correspondence is of such a nature, that the
present theory of spectra is in a certain sense to be regarded as a ra-
tional generalization of the ordinary theory of radiation. (Bohr 1920,
23–24)
In 1923, Bohr was still convinced of the formal character of the corre-
spondence principle, as it is evident from the following quotation:
If the correspondence principle cannot instruct us in a direct manner
concerning the nature of the process of radiation and the cause of the
stability of the stationary states, it does elucidate the application of
the quantum theory in such a way that one can anticipate an inner
consistency for this theory of a kind similar to the formal consistency
of the classical theory. (Bohr 1923a, 25)
4. For a Kantian interpretation of the correspondence principle
It should be noted that some commentators (Shimony 1983; Honner 1987;
Faye 1991; Faye 2014; Beller 1999; MacKinnon 2012) argued that in empha-
sizing the necessity of the classical concepts for the description of quantum
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phenomena, Bohr applied a transcendental method to his interpretation of
quantummechanics. For example, Shimony (1983) noted that Bohr claimed
that an unequivocal description of an atomic phenomenon must include a
description of all the relevant elements of the experimental apparatus as a
consequence of the introduction of the quantum of action. is issue is an
aspect of the indispensability of classical concepts as far as these concepts
are a direct extension of our intuition: they are necessary to describe ex-
periments and to communicate to others what we have done and learned.
at is, an epistemological divide between classical concepts and quantum
phenomena is triggered by the introduction of the Planck’s h, which recalls
the Kantian demarcation between “phenomenon” and “noumenon.” What
is important is not the world in it-self, but what can be described. Moreover,
Bohr denied that classical concepts could be used to attribute properties to
a physical world “in-itself ” behind the phenomena, i.e. properties dierent
from those being observed (Faye 2014). On the same track, Honner (1987)
emphasized Bohr’s insistence, following Heisenberg, that “quantummanip-
ulations” be restricted to “observables.”
Mara Beller (1999) rightly emphasized in Bohr’s works the connections
between key concepts, such as causality, visualizability, objectivity, and the
distinction between subject and object, which rmly entrenched in Kantian
philosophy.
According to MacKinnon, Bohr had been using a distinction between
descriptive concepts and formal concepts, or concepts whose meaning de-
pends on functioning in a system.is aspect of Bohr’s insight into quantum
physics ts neatly a transcendental interpretation of Bohr’s thinking.
More specically, other specialists (Chevalley 1994; Pringe 2007; 2009)
recognized in the enunciation of the correspondence principle the mark of
Kant’s philosophy, as far as the analogical procedure underlying this princi-
ple would link to Kant’s conception of symbolic presentation, which indeed
uses analogy.
e origin of Kant’s usage of analogy can be traced back to theAnschau-
ung-Symbol distinction, which Kant dealt with in the Critique of Judgment
from 1790.
In the Critique of Pure Reason from 1781, Kant had laid down the proce-
dure of “Transcendental Schemata,” according to which the understanding
applies its categories to whatever is presented in a priori forms of intuition,
i.e. space and time.
is procedural rule is established either in relation to pure intuition, as
for mathematics, or in relation to empirical intuition, as for physics. When
no sensation can be directly presented in intuition (as for the concept ofGod,
which can only be thought by Reason), hypotheses, i.e. “presentations,” have
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to be regarded as symbolical.at is to say: only an indirect presentation of
the concept in intuition is allowed.
Kant argued that these hypotheses are either “schemata” (containing di-
rect presentations of concepts in intuition) or “symbol” (containing indirect
presentations of concepts in intuition).
Schemata perform this procedure demonstratively, whereas symbols do
this bymeans of an analogy, in which the power of judgment plays a twofold
role: on the one hand, it applies “the concept to the object of a sensible in-
tuition,” on the other hand, it applies “the mere rule of reection on that
intuition to an entirely dierent object, of which the rst is only the symbol”
(Kant 2000, 352).
Let us compare Kant’s line of reasoning with regard to “analogy” and
“symbol” with the conceptual structure of Bohr’s correspondence principle.
e quantum theory is based on the quantum postulate as an empirical
assumption. Nevertheless, this postulate undermines the possibility to apply
the categories of understanding to a quantum object as an object of possible
experience; that is, the quantum postulate does not permit a direct presen-
tation of quantum concepts in intuition, as it violates a necessary condition
for the interpretation of empirical results: the causal connection between
electronic motion and radiation.
It turns out that quantum concepts can be represented only by analogy.
e electronicmotion in a stationary state, for instance, cannot be presented
directly in intuition, as this motion lacks the empirical content associated
to radiation spectra (Pringe 2007). It follows that the “presentation” of the
motion of the electron in a stationary state assumes a symbolic character,
i.e. it is merely formal. e symbolic presentation of quantum events uses
the correspondence principle, which, indeed, requires that some of the rela-
tions satised by the classical harmonics of motion should be preserved for
quantum-theoretical intensities.
On the one hand, the power of judgment applies a “concept” to the clas-
sical harmonics of motion, which stand for an object of the sensible intu-
ition; on the other hand, the power of judgment applies “the mere rule” by
which it reects on “that sensible intuition” (classical harmonics of motion)
to quantum-theoretical intensities, of which the classical harmonics of mo-
tion are the symbol. It is evident that the correspondence principle makes
possible the re-presentation of quantum events (in analogous intuition) by
a transfer of rule or structure (Chevalley 1994) between two quite dierent
things: from classical harmonics of motion (which are objects of sensuous
intuition) to quantum phenomena (to which “reection” applies the struc-
ture of the object of sensuous intuition). e correspondence relation thus
provides a quantum phenomenon with the “formal structure” of the “con-
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cept” of the corresponding classical harmonic component of motion, which
is used as the symbol of that quantum phenomenon.
e correspondence principle is the analogical procedure by which an
atomic process, for instance the transition of an electron between stationary
states, can be predicted through the presence of the corresponding classical
harmonic of motion.
is correspondence between frequencies determined by the two
methods must have a deeper signicance and we are led to anticipate
that it will also apply to the intensities.is is equivalent to the state-
ment that, when the quantum numbers are large, the relative proba-
bility of a particular transition is connected in a simple manner with
the amplitude of the corresponding harmonic component in the mo-
tion.is peculiar relation suggests a general law for the occurrence of
transitions between stationary states. us we shall assume that even
when the quantum numbers are small the possibility of transition be-
tween two stationary states is connected with the presence of a certain
harmonic component in the motion of the system. (Bohr 1920, 27–28,
italics added)
I want to make clear a point with regard to the relationships between
Kant and Bohr. Namely, I do not want to argue that Bohr’s correspondence
principle stems from Kant’s procedure of analogy. Neither do I want to lay
emphasis on Bohr’s debts towards Kant’s philosophy,1 except for the termi-
nology. I am rather convinced that certain similarities between the logical
procedures used by the two thinkers cannot be denied. Following a previous
comparison between Kant’s analogy and Bohr’s correspondence principle, it
seems to me that the correspondence principle is to the classical “concepts”
of space and time, as these a priori forms of sensible intuition, in Kant, are
related to the separate faculty of pure intuition. I argue once more that the
correspondence relation, at least until 1924, was compatible with a Kantian-
like scheme, and no longer could be an integral part of the 1925 Heisenberg’s
(and Max Born and Pascal Jordan) matrix mechanics, the reason being that
a new type of correspondence would have been established in the new quan-
tum mechanics, based on a dierent kind of relation.
5. Conclusion
e present discussion is a contribution to the long-standing philosophical
debate concerning the conceptual foundations of the correspondence prin-
1 As is well known, Bohr had little acquaintance with Kant’s philosophy (Murdoch 1987),
and what he knew of this probably stemmed from Harald Høding’s philosophy course,
which Bohr attended during the rst year of the university, and through discussions with
his friends and colleagues at the “Ekliptica Club.” However, it would be hard to argue that
Bohr built his atomic theory on Kant’s philosophy.
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ciple. Specically, I here sought to shednew light on the conceptual structure
of the early version of the correspondence principle, whose similarity with
Kant’s procedure of analogy is so close that it was dicult to overlook it.
As is well known, Bohr was very interested in philosophical issues since
his youth, and in many public occasions he recognized his cultural debt
to Harald Høding—a professor of philosophy at the University of Copen-
hagen, a close friend of Niels’ father, and Niels’ mentor during the rst year
at the university in Copenhagen—for having introduced him to the study of
fundamental philosophical questions. However, Bohr was mainly a scien-
tist, and he never blurred the boundaries between philosophy and scientic
investigation. One fact cannot be denied: the striking conceptual similarity
between the correspondence principle and Kant’s procedure of analogy.
In particular, this similarity can help us to clarify the conceptual break-
through characterizing the transition from the early correspondence prin-
ciple to a new correspondence relation. For this reason, as I wanted to re-
mind, the correspondence relation, at least until 1924, was compatible with a
Kantian-like scheme, and no longer could be an integral part of the newma-
trix mechanics, the reason being that a new type of correspondence would
have been established in 1925, based on a dierent kind of relation.
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